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Civil Procedure: 
Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens1 
 
Scott Dodson 
 
Litigation in the United States is increasingly international.  Of the 
five significant personal jurisdiction cases that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has decided since 2011, three have involved alien defendants.2  In these 
cases and others, the Court has treated foreign and domestic defendants 
the same under the “minimum contacts” standard for personal 
jurisdiction: for all defendants, a court may rely only on the defendant’s 
contacts with the specific state in which the court sits.3 
This chapter urges reconsideration of this approach for alien 
defendants.  The relevant forum for determining an alien’s minimum 
contacts should be the United States as a whole rather than the 
particular state in which the court sits. 
Others have advocated such a national-contacts approach to 
personal jurisdiction in other contexts, including in federal but not state 
courts, for federal but not state claims, and under the Fifth but not the 
Fourteenth Amendment.4  The claim in this chapter that a critical 
distinction—overlooked in other formulations of a national-contacts 
approach—is between alien and domestic defendants.  That claim is 
supported by the twin principles of fairness and interstate sovereignty 
that animate personal jurisdiction, is unaffected by foreign relations, is 
consistent with the Court’s recent majority opinions, and offers an 
answer to the Court’s inability to muster a majority opinion in 
McIntyre.  Of course, Congress can authorize a national-contacts 
approach in federal court for federal claims, even under existing 
constitutional law, but the claim here is that the Constitution allows 
national-contacts personal jurisdiction over aliens in state court and for 
state claims too. 
 
 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, 
Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205 (2018). 
 2. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tire 
Ops, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 
564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 3. This standard applies in federal court under Rule 4(k). FED. R. CIV. P. 
4(k)(1)(A). 
 4. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 1, at 1207 (citing authorities). 
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The Case for National Contacts 
 
Personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clauses is grounded in 
two different jurisprudential justifications: fairness to the defendant and 
“interstate federalism.”5  Both support a national-contacts approach for 
personal jurisdiction over aliens. 
For fairness to a domestic defendant, the particular state forum 
matters.  Domestic defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in the 
state where they are at home.6  They choose to reside in that state, with 
its familiar laws and procedures, knowing that they can be sued there 
for any and all claims.  Compared to litigating in their home states, 
domestic defendants face high burdens of litigating in other states, with 
the potential costs of travel and relatively unfamiliar laws, procedures, 
and jurors.  Given those sensitivities, domestic defendants may even try 
to structure their business affairs to avoid certain states.  Fairness is a 
key issue for personal jurisdiction over domestic defendants, but it is an 
issue of relative fairness among domestic forums, specifically, whether 
a domestic defendant may be sued in a state other than its home state. 
For alien defendants, by contrast, the particular state forum is 
largely irrelevant.  After Daimler, nonresident aliens are not (except in 
extraordinary cases) “at home” in any state and are not subject to 
general jurisdiction anywhere in the United States.  Aliens have no U.S. 
home state with familiar procedures; all U.S. courts are foreign to them.  
Whatever interstate differences exist among U.S. courts is of little 
concern to alien defendants in light of the stark differences between 
litigation in the United States and litigation outside the United States—
including broad discovery, the prevalence of juries, the possibility of 
punitive and other noneconomic damages, the requirement that each 
side bear its own litigation costs and fees regardless of who prevails, 
and the propensity of U.S. plaintiffs’ attorneys to use contingency-fee 
agreements—dwarf the relatively more modest differences in litigation 
among the states.7  The same argument applies to travel burdens; for 
                                                 
 5. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
292–93 (1980) (focusing on interstate federalism), with Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The 
personal jurisdiction requirement . . . represents a restriction on judicial power 
not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”); and with 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017) 
(stating that the right to be free from the coercive power of the state depends, in 
part, on the interstate-federalism limitations on that coercive power). 
 6. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. 
 7. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981). 
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the most part, aliens are far more concerned about the travel costs and 
burdens of litigating in America generally than in a particular state. 
Finally, many aliens engaged in commercial enterprises treat the United 
States as a single market rather than a state-specific market.8  Their 
concern is not to target specific states but rather to deal in as many 
states as possible, regardless which ones those are.  Of course, aliens 
may care a great deal about avoiding suit anywhere in the United 
States.  But once their contacts justify suit somewhere in the United 
States, they ought not care—at least for fairness reasons—exactly 
where. 
Unusual burdens associated with one state but not another could 
exist.  Perhaps one state has a locality acutely hostile to aliens, or to the 
particular defendant.  Or perhaps the burden on an alien defendant’s 
domestic witnesses would be greater in one state over another.  The 
response to these burdens is they are not the concern of the minimum-
contacts component of personal jurisdiction.  These burdens are 
primarily the concern of the venue doctrine, which is available to 
address them. 
From the perspective of the alien defendant, therefore, it is fairest 
to think of minimum contacts as contacts with the United States as a 
whole.  And if the alien defendant has sufficient minimum contacts 
with the United States, then it must be fair to hale the defendant into the 
United States to be held accountable for harms related to those 
contacts.  Otherwise, an alien defendant with minimum contacts with 
the nation who happens not to have minimum contacts with any one 
state could cause harm in all fifty states but nevertheless escape 
personal jurisdiction in all U.S. courts. 
Interstate federalism is the other component of personal 
jurisdiction.  The idea is that a domestic defendant’s decision to submit 
to a particular state of domicile gives that state primary regulatory 
authority over that defendant.  For another state to assert personal 
jurisdiction over a domestic defendant is an intrusion on this authority 
of the home state, an intrusion that would be violate interstate 
federalism unless justified by the kind of contacts with the second state 
that would give rise to specific jurisdiction.9  Of course, more than one 
state might try to claim specific jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court has 
                                                 
 8. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 898 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (focusing on the defendant’s “endeavors to reach and 
profit from the United States market as a whole”). 
 9. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) 
(focusing on the requirements for forcing a party to defend “away from its 
‘home’”). 
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always assumed that multiple states might constitutionally assert 
specific jurisdiction over the same defendant for the same claim 
without regard to interstate federalism as among them.10  To the 
contrary, interstate federalism only restrains a state’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction when it intrudes on the authority of the 
defendant’s home state. 
Unlike a domestic defendant, an alien defendant is not “at home” 
in any U.S. state, and thus any state’s assertion of specific jurisdiction 
over the alien cannot intrude on any home state’s authority.  Thus, 
interstate federalism is no bar to a national-contacts approach to 
personal jurisdiction over alien defendants. 
Of course, a national-contacts approach does enlarge the number of 
courts that could assert personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant; in 
essence, if the defendant establishes minimum contacts with the United 
States, then the minimum-contacts test is met for courts all states, 
including courts in a state which has no connection to the defendant.  
But, to repeat, such a scenario, at least with respect to alien defendants, 
both is constitutionally fair and poses no interstate-federalism 
problems.  Venue statutes and doctrines of forum non conveniens are 
available to rectify such anomalies. 
A national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction over aliens 
does broaden personal jurisdiction in ways that implicate the interests 
of other countries.  Other countries might refuse to recognize U.S. 
judgments, and a broad U.S. jurisdiction might interfere with the 
nation’s ability to negotiate international agreements. Those are 
concerns, to be sure, but they are policy concerns, not constitutional 
concerns.  Congress can always restrict the scope of personal 
jurisdiction by statute to accommodate foreign-relations concerns. 
 
National Contacts in State Courts 
 
This chapter argues for a rule dependent upon the alienage status 
of the defendant, not upon the source of law or the nature of the forum. 
                                                 
 10. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774–78 
(1984) (allowing New Hampshire to assert personal jurisdiction over a claim 
involving harm suffered by a New York resident in other states); cf. McIntyre, 
564 U.S. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“New Jersey’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose dangerous product caused a 
workplace injury in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or diminish the 
sovereignty, of any sister State.”). 
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Thus, a national-contacts test for personal jurisdiction over aliens 
applies to all claims, state or federal, and in all courts, state or federal.11 
The constitutionality of a national-contacts approach to personal 
jurisdiction over aliens in state court under state law begins with an 
easy proposition: The Fifth Amendment demands only a national-
contacts approach to federal-question cases in federal court.12  
Congress has passed nationwide-service statutes on that assumption,13 
and the Supreme Court has promulgated nationwide service rules.14 
With respect to state-law cases in federal courts, Rule 4(k) 
generally incorporates the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitations on state 
courts,15 but only as matter of rule, not constitutional obligation. This is 
evidenced by Rule 4(k)’s so-called “bulge rule,” which permits 
jurisdiction over joined parties who are served within 100 miles of the 
federal courthouse,16 a rule that would be unconstitutional if federal 
courts were required to follow state lines when hearing state-law cases. 
Again, only the Fifth Amendment applies to federal courts directly. 
The question then becomes why the answer should be different for 
state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Technically, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is a separate clause from 
its Fifth Amendment counterpart.  But if the words “due process” 
dictate a national-contacts approach for personal jurisdiction under the 
Fifth Amendment, then the same words ought to do the same under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  As this chapter has already shown, the 
                                                 
 11. States would, of course, be free to require state-specific contacts for 
alien defendants in their long-arm statutes in the absence of preemption by 
federal law. 
 12. Although the Court has not expressly so held, it has strongly hinted as 
much.  See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884 (“Because the United States is a distinct 
sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States but not of any particular State.”); Omni Capital Int’l, 
Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 111 (1987) (“A narrowly tailored 
service of process provision, authorizing service on an alien in a federal-
question case when the alien is not amenable to service under the applicable 
long-arm statute, might well serve the ends of the CEA and other federal 
statutes.”); cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619-20 
(1992) (applying a national-contacts approach to FSIA).  
 13. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22; Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
77v; Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2334(a). 
 14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
 15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
 16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B). 
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fairness concerns to an alien defendant and the interstate federalism 
concerns embodied in the Constitution dictate a national-contacts 
approach regardless of the constitutional source of those concerns. 
If there is no good reason to distinguish between federal and state 
courts with respect to alien defendants, there is one very powerful 
reason not to do so: uniformity in personal-jurisdiction rules guards 
against vertical forum shopping and inequitable administration of the 
laws.17  If federal courts applied a national-contacts approach to 
personal jurisdiction over aliens, while state courts applied a state-
contacts approach, then plaintiffs might seek ways to abuse diversity 
jurisdiction by, for example, invoking diversity jurisdiction even in the 
plaintiff’s home state.18  Such plaintiffs would also have an unfair 
advantage over similarly situated alien plaintiffs, who would not be 
able to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction.19  Thus, “the accident of 
diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration 
of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side.”20  
Alternatively, plaintiffs might add relatively insignificant federal 
claims in an effort to secure a federal forum.  It is for such reasons of 
vertical uniformity that portions of the federal court long-arm rule 
mirror state court personal jurisdiction.21  Adopting a national-contacts 
approach only for federal courts would violate this principle of 
uniformity. 
 
Controlling the Scope of National Contacts 
 
A national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction only rarely, if 
ever, should produce a forum that is unfair to an alien defendant.  
Nevertheless, it is possible that a particular forum within the United 
States could impose meaningful inconveniences or litigation burdens 
on an alien defendant.  An alien defendant from Vancouver, for 
example, whose claim-related U.S. conduct is concentrated in Seattle, 
Washington, might face inconvenience and other burdens if sued by a 
Seattle plaintiff in, say, a rural South Carolina court. 
                                                 
 17. These goals are sometimes associated with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
 19. The Constitution’s grant of alienage jurisdiction does not extend to 
cases between two aliens.  See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 
304 (1809). 
 20. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941). 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
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The minimum-contacts component of personal jurisdiction, 
however, is not the only determinant of forum.  Other doctrines can 
help isolate an appropriate forum under a national-contacts approach to 
personal jurisdiction over alien defendants, including doctrines of 
reasonableness, venue, and forum non conveniens.  
The Supreme Court has made clear that even when minimum 
contacts exist, the Due Process Clauses prohibit the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction when it would be unreasonable.22  In the case of 
the Vancouver defendant, defending in South Carolina might be 
unreasonably burdensome given the more reasonable forum in Seattle.  
Importantly, the minimum-contacts analysis would still be established 
by the defendant’s national contacts, whether in a Seattle court or a 
South Carolina court, and thus would ensure that at least one U.S. court 
is available if those national contacts are sufficient.  But reasonableness 
serves as a limited check for cases in which the plaintiff selects a court 
that would impose unusual burdens on alien defendants relative to the 
other factors in the reasonableness analysis. 
A case in federal court is subject to rules of venue under federal 
law.  In domestic-defendant cases, venue law is restrictive,23 but in 
alien-defendant cases, venue is proper in any federal district court.24  It 
is worth noting that venue’s approach to aliens is consistent with a 
national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction.  However, venue 
transfer offers an important mechanism for moving the suit to the most 
convenient location.  The venue-transfer statute allows transfer “[f]or 
the convenience of parties and witnesses” to any district where the case 
“might have been brought.”25  Because every federal court would have 
proper venue in an alien-defendant case based on nationwide personal 
jurisdiction, the venue statute allows such a case to be quickly 
transferred to the most convenient and appropriate U.S. forum.  The rub 
is that any inconveniences imposed on alien defendants by a national-
contacts approach to personal jurisdiction can be remedied in federal 
court by venue transfer.  The Vancouver defendant, for example, 
should easily be able to transfer an action filed in South Carolina 
federal court to a Seattle federal court. 
One nuance of national venue complicates matters: where the case 
begins affects which law applies to the case, no matter where it ends up 
                                                 
 22. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113, 115 
(1987). 
 23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 
 24. See id. § 1391(d). 
 25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
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if transferred for convenience reasons.26  Plaintiffs thus might choose a 
particular forum because of the particular law that forum would apply. 
Two responses to this complication lessen its concern.  First, law 
shopping is an accepted and anticipated cost of the U.S. system of 
horizontal federalism.27  For better or worse, plaintiffs are entitled to 
law-shop through horizontal forum shopping, and this shopping is 
available regardless of the alienage status of the defendant.  Second, in 
alien-defendant cases, the opportunities for law-shopping-through-
forum-shopping conduct are quite limited because the alien defendant’s 
status as an outsider narrows the range of possibly applicable law. 
Choice-of-law regimes generally reject the application of the law of a 
jurisdiction with only minimal connections to the case and instead 
focus on the connections of the plaintiff, the claim, and the defendant.  
The alien defendant’s absence from the United States will thus train 
focus on the connections of the plaintiff and the claim—and therefore 
on a narrower range of applicable laws.  In short, it is highly unlikely 
that a national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction over aliens 
will result in a case tried under the substantive law of a state that no 
party anticipated. 
In state court, transfer to less burdensome forums is also possible. 
Aliens can remove all federal law cases from state court to federal court 
based on federal question jurisdiction and most state law cases based on 
alienage jurisdiction.28  Once in federal court, the alien defendant can 
move to transfer to a more convenient state under the federal venue-
transfer rules.  When removal is unavailable or undesirable, the alien 
defendant may ask a state court to dismiss under the state’s doctrine of 
forum non conveniens if the suit could be brought in another state or 
foreign court and the alternative forum would be more appropriate. 
Reasonableness, venue transfer, and forum non conveniens thus all 
help control the breadth of a national-contacts approach to personal 
jurisdiction over aliens.  They work in tandem with the national-
contacts approach to isolate the most reasonable and convenient forum, 
while retaining the national-contacts approach’s insistence that U.S. 
courts are available to hear a case involving sufficient national contacts.  
If these legal doctrines are not enough to protect alien defendants, 
alien defendants can take matters into their own hands.  Defendants can 
enter into contracts with forum-selection clauses that limit the range of 
                                                 
 26. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 524–25 (1990). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
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possible courts in which the signatory can sue the defendant.29  
Arbitration clauses, which are used widely around the world, are one 
kind of forum-selection clause and are specifically enforceable in 
federal courts, even in a state-law case.30  Further, an alien defendant 
who wishes to avoid the burden of litigating in U.S. court retains the 
option of defaulting and resisting enforcement of the U.S. judgment.31  
If the alien defendant does not have assets in the United States against 
which a U.S. judgment can be enforced, the plaintiff will have to seek 
enforcement of the default judgment in another country where 
enforcement may be infeasible for a U.S. plaintiff.  As a practical 
matter, this practical reality may provide the greatest protection for 
Justice Breyer’s small Egyptian shirtmaker or Kenyan coffee farmer.32 
 
Conclusion 
 
A national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction over aliens is 
justified by fairness, federalism, and practicality.  The approach 
resolves some of the Court’s open personal-jurisdiction questions while 
maintaining consistency with existing precedent.  The approach also 
maximizes the opportunities for Congress and the states to legislate or 
make rules to control the scope of personal jurisdiction over aliens if 
the constitutional scope is too broad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 29. See Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 49–51 (2014).  If the forum-selection clause specifies a U.S. 
federal court, venue transfer pursuant to the forum-selection clause mandates 
that the transferee court apply its own choice-of-law rules instead of those of 
the transferor court, which curtails opportunities for plaintiffs to shop for 
favorable law.  See Atl. Mar. Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 134 S. Ct. 568, 579 
(2013). 
 30. 9 U.S.C. § 205. 
 31. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). 
 32. See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
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